The aim of the article is the problem of family dysfunction, implying the original issuance of orders by the Court aimed at validating the deficiencies noticed by parents in exercising the rights resulting from parental authority as a less painful measure. Then, an analysis of the premises for depriving parents of parental authority and applying the most severe measure in this respect, in this respect, in relation to the other parent, in a situation where, in fact, one parent is accused of neglecting the exercise of that authority. The author notes the mechanical application by the Courts of ordinances pursuant to Art. 109 of the Family and Guardianship Code Act, recognizing that they constitute a taxative catalog. The author notices archaism in the institution of the supporting family, as well as in the gradation of orders limiting parental authority to parents to place children in a foster family or institutional custody, even in the actual state of the case, where there are no grounds for depriving them of parental authority. The problem of the correlation of these provisions and the deprivation of parental authority in the event of its abuse by one of the parents living together is a legal gap that should be filled with axiological principles, bearing in mind the welfare of children, as well as the right to live in a biological family.