The author focuses on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in two sensitive areas related to the end of human life, notably euthanasia and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (passive euthanasia). These highly controversial issues required the Court to answer crucial questions regarding the scope and essence of the obligations of state parties under Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Over twenty years ago, in Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002), the concise formulation of Article 2 of the ECHR inevitably led the Court to conclude that the Convention does not guarantee the „right to euthanasia”. However, this has not prevented the Court from inferring a general right to decide on one's end of life as an element of privacy protected under Article 8 of the ECHR. Since the judgment in Pretty, the case law of the Court on assisted suicide and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment has been balancing between conflicting interests. Having adjudicated several landmark cases, mainly from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, and France, the Court has calibrated the essence and scope of the states' margin of appreciation to allow (or not allowing) assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. However, one should not expect that the Court's standards will satisfy everybody's expectations, given the different philosophical, ethical, and religious approaches to human death and the state's role in protecting the right to life.